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RACIAL DESIGNATION IN LOUISIANA:
ONE DROP OF BLACK BLOOD MAKES A NEGRO!
By Kenneth A. Davis*
Negro blood is sure powerful-because just one drop of black
blood makes a colored man. One drop-you are a Negro!
Langston Hughes'
Introduction
The year is 1976. A child is born visually white. Yet the
registrar of vital statistics for the state board of health classifies the child
as negro after having traced the child's genealogical lines back to a
great, great, great grandparent who was designated as "colored" or
"mulatto." Such a designation, made prior to the Civil War, is used
today in Louisiana to determine the child's fraction of negro blood. If
the child has more than 1/32 negro blood, he or she is classified negro.2
For many years states have classified their black populations,
usually by such terms as negro, mulatto, colored or black. The defini-
tions have been used in conjunction with various racially restrictive
statutes regulating such things as miscegenation, adoption, integration of
schools, transportation, sale of property and naturalization.3 However,
the Supreme Court of the United States has held that racial classification
is "constitutionally suspect,"4 and therefore subject to strict judicial
scrutiny.5 The Court has found these classifications deny the equal
protection of the law under the Fourteenth Amendment,6 and has
* Member, third year class.
1. Simple Takes a Wife (1953).
2. The author recognizes contemporary preference for the designation of persons
of the negro race as black. However, it is necessary in some instances for purposes of
clarity in this note to adopt explicitly the phrases and designations formerly used by the
various legislatures and courts.
3. See R. SICKLES, RACE, MARRIAGE, AND THE LAW (1972); STATES' LAWS ON RACE
AND COLOR (P. Murray ed. 1950); G. STEPHENSON, RACE DISTINCTIONS IN AMERICAN
LAW (1910); Reference, Legal Definition of Race, 3 RACE REL. L. REP. 571 (1958).
4. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964).
5. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954); Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
6. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943); Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886). See Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399 (1964).
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sustained them only when necessary to the accomplishment of a com-
pelling state interest.7 Today the Court enunciates its equal protection
policy in terms of protecting persons against invidious discrimination.8
Almost all states have repealed their racially-restrictive statutes.
For example, Louisiana's anti-miscegenation statute prohibiting mar-
riages between white persons and persons of color was repealed in
1972.9 However, in 1970 the Louisiana state legislature enacted Act
46 of 1970 entitled, "Designation of race by public officials." It
provides:
In signifying race, a person having one thirty second or less of
Negro blood shall not be deemed, described or designated by any
public official in the state of Louisiana as "colored," a "mulatto,"
a "black," a "negro," a "griffe," an "Afro-American," a "qua-
droon," a "mestizo," a "colored person" or a "person of color."' 0
The registrar of vital statistics for the Louisiana State Board of
Health has used Act 46 since its adoption as a guideline for classifying a
person according to race on his or her birth certificate. Since 1970
three mandamus proceedings seeking to change the registrar's determi-
nation that the litigant was negro under Act 46 have reached the
appellate level." In order to have the racial designation changed on a
birth certificate the litigant must show that there is "no doubt at all" as
to his or her racial status, a burden of proof firmly established in
Louisiana.' z
In the most recent of these actions, the Supreme Court of Louis-
7. Cf. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969); Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398, 406 (1963); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960).
8. Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 631-32 (1972); Turner v. Fouche, 396
U.S. 346, 362 (1970); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192-93 (1964); Skinner
v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). See Cox, The Supreme Court, 1965 Term-
Foreward: Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARv.
L. REv. 91 (1966); Forum: Equal Protection and the Burger Court, 2 HAST. CONST. L.
Q. 645 (1975); Karst, Invidious Discrimination: Justice Douglas and the Return to the
"Natural-Law-Due-Process Formula," 16 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 716 (1969); Note, Develop-
ments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065 (1969). See also Tuss-
man & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REv. 341 (1949).
But cf. Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term-Foreiward: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L.
REV. 1 (1972).
9. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 94 (Supp. 1, 1975), formerly La. Act No. 54 of 1894,
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 94 (1958). But see LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:201 (1965) (pro-
hibiting marriages between Indians and persons of the colored and black race). On the
operation of art. 94 before its amendment, see Comment, Louisiana Law on the Nullity
of Marriage, 20 LA. L. Rsv. 563, 572-74 (1960); Comment, Thc Annulment of Mar-
riages in Louisiana, 24 TUL. L. REv. 217, 224-25 (1949).
10. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 42:267 (Supp. 23A, 1975).
11. See text accompanying notes 19-27 infra.
12. See note 70 infra.
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iana in State ex rel. Plaia v. Louisiana State Board of Health13 affirmed
the court of appeal14 in voiding the registrar's determination as to
appellant's race. However, it reversed the lower court's finding that Act
46 is unconstitutionally vague. The court stated that the act is neither
so vague that it cannot be administered nor void because of invidious
racial discrimination stemming from its application. The court con-
strued the act as merely definitional, not proscriptive.
Act 46 of 1970 expressly establishes a racial classification. How-
ever, it is not the author's purpose to suggest that all racial classifications
are invalid. As the Court stated in Ferguson v. Skrupa: "Statutes create
many classifications which do not deny equal protection; it is only
'invidious discrimination' which offends the Constitution."' 5  Racial
classifications are used for many valid governmental purposes: achiev-
ing racial balance in schools; the collection and maintenance of proper
census and employment statistics; and the administration of aid pro-
grams to minority groups.' 6 It is difficult to accomplish these purposes
without accurate information on the racial composition of the popula-
tion.17
Although the state may have a valid interest in classifying its
citizens according to race, certain questions remain unanswered con-
cerning the application of Act 46. Does the statute provide a clear,
specific formula for racial classification? Is the classification arbitrary
or unreasonable? Is there actual harm under such a classification?
Moreover, what potential harms are raised through the use of such a
classification?
The focal point of this note is whether Louisiana's Act 46 of 1970
13. 296 So. 2d 809 (La. 1974).
14. State ex rel. Plaia v. Louisiana Bd. of Health, 275 So. 2d 201 (La. App. 1973).
15. 372 U.S. 726, 732 (1963). Similarly, the Court held in Carrington v. Rash,
380 U.S. 89, 92 (1965) that mere classification does not of itself deprive a group of
equal protection.
16. See Tancil v. Woolls and Virginia Bd. of Elections v. Hamm, 379 U.S. 19
(1964) (per curiam), aff'g 230 F. Supp. 156 (E.D. Va. 1964). The district court noted
that the designation of race may in certain records serve a useful purpose, and the pro-
curement and compilation of such information by state authorities cannot be outlawed
per se: "For example, the securing and chronicling of racial data for identification or
statistical use violates no constitutional privilege. If the purpose is legitimate, the reason
justifiable, then no infringement results." 230 F. Supp. at 158.
17. In Porcelli v. Titus, 431 F.2d 1254 (3d Cir. 1970), the court upheld the use
of information regarding teachers' races by a school board in its program to make the
faculty more racially integrated: "State action based partly on considerations of color,
when color is not used per se, and in furtherance of a proper governmental objective,
is not necessarily a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 1257. But see Pe-
dersen v. Burton, 400 F. Supp. 960 (D.D.C. 1975) (statute requiring disclosure of race
on marriage license applications found unconstitutional under equal protection clause
upon failure to show a compelling governmental interest).
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violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution
of the United States.18  The 1/32 test embodied in Act 46, it is argued,
is arbitrary and vague as currently applied, presenting tangible harms to
those subject to its application. Furthermore, this note demonstrates
the potential harm of such a statute; the 1/32 test of Act 46 may be
used to circumvent various federal programs which place blacks in a
preferred position. An underlying issue is whether a state may constitu-
tionally establish an arbitrary racial classification which limits or dilutes
the class of persons intended to benefit under federally created rights.
I. Operation of Act 46:
The Case of Elizabeth Maria Plaia
Three mandamus proceedings have reached the state appellate
level challenging the Louisiana registrar of vital statistics' determination
that the litigant was negro. In Thomas v. Louisiana State Board of
Health,'9 the board of health had changed the racial designation of Ms.
Thomas and her children to negro after determining that they had 5/32
and 2.5/32 negro blood, respectively. In Messina v. Ciaccio,21 the
registrar determined that the child was 3/32 negro. In State ex rel.
Plaia v. Louisiana State Board of Health,2' the parents sought a birth
certificate for their child, Elizabeth Maria Plaia, age five, which would
reflect her race as white, despite the registrar's determination that the
child had 5.75/32 negro blood. This last case well illustrates the use of
Act 46.22
18. There may also be deprivations under the Louisiana Constitution. See LA.
CONsT. art. 1. § 2 (due process of law), § 3 (right to individual dignity), § 12 (freedom
from discrimination) (adopted 1974). Such state constitutional arguments are not ad-
dressed in this note.
19. 278 So. 2d 915 (La. App. 1973).
20. 290 So. 2d 339 (La. App. 1974).
21. 275 So. 2d 201 (La. App. 1973).
22. The textual discussion in this footnote illustrates how the registrar in Plaia
computed the child Elizabeth's fraction of negro blood. Also included is the genealogi-
cal chart which was incorporated into the Plaia appellate opinion, 275 So. 2d at 206.
All specific references regarding evidence of racial designation on birth records, death
records, marriage certificcates, and the board of health's conclusions as to fractions of
negro blood are found in Brief for Defendant-Appellee at 5-9, State ex rel. Plaia v. Lou-
isiana Bd. of Health, 275 So. 2d 201 (La. App. 1973) and are corroborated in the appel-
late court's discussion of the case.
To compute the fraction of negro blood the registrar followed the formula:
of the father's fraction of negro blood (FNB) was added to %k of the mother's
fraction of negro blood (MNB) to equal the child's fraction of negro blood (CNB).
In formula: % of (FNB) + of (MNB) = CNB.
The registrar first noted that all evidence indicated the paternal ancestors were
white. However, the registrar traced the maternal line back six generations. The
[Vol. 3
Upon the birth of Elizabeth Maria Plaia in Jefferson Parish, Louis-
iana, her mother filed with the registrar of vital statistics a certificate of
live birth declaring that Elizabeth's father and mother wero white.
1/32 determination rested initially on the alleged union between an unknown Frenchman
and one Marie Therese who was racially noted as a native of Africa. The state's evi-
dence consisted of a reproduction of the Clarion Herald Newspaper, June 1970, vol. 8,
no. 17, and other publications discussing the history of the Metoyer family, but these
were improperly excluded by the trial court. 275 So. 2d at 205.
The registrar assumed that the unknown Frenchman had no negro blood, but that
Marie Therese was a full-blooded negro. The calculation for their child, Augustin
Metoyer, was as follows: % of (0) + % of (1) = . The registrar determined
that Augustin Metoyer had % negro blood.
Augustin married a woman of unknown racial background. Their child, Jean Bap-
tiste Metroyer, was born in about 1826. Since the mother's race was unknown, the reg-
istrar assumed the mother was white and determined that the child was negro. Jean
Baptiste was listed on one document placed in evidence as a freeman of color and in
the 1850 census as mulatto.
Jean Baptiste Metoyer married Suzette Anty whom evidence described as mulatto.
The registrar therefore ascribed negro blood to Suzette. From Jean Baptiste (/4)
and Suzette (%), the registrar had computed that their child, Marie Julia, had %
negro blood. The 1870 and 1880 census records showed Marie Julia as mulatto,
although her death certificate listed her as white.
Marie Julia married Firmin Capello Christophe who was the child of Firmin Chris-
tophe and Marie Francesco Mailleur. Firmin's father was described on his death certifi-
cate as colored, while the 1850 census listed him and his wife as mulatto. The registrar
determined that each was 1/ negro, thereby making Firmin Capello negro. The
union of Firmin Capello Christophe (,) and Marie Julie Metoyer (%) produced a
child born about 1863, Florentine Christophe, who was determined to be 7/16 negro.
Florentine married Clothilde Llorens whose father, Clay Llorens, was listed in the
1860, 1870, and 1880 census reports as mulatto. Clothilde's mother, Harriet Prud-
homme, appeared as mulatto in the 1850-1880 census reports. The registrar concluded
that Clothilde was born of two mulattoes and was % negro, despite her death certifi-
cate, which described her as white. Therefore, the registrar contended that the offspring
of Clothilde ( ) and Florentine Christophe (7/16), Atha Lucy Christophe, was 15/32
negro. It is noteworthy that Atha's two sisters gave birth to three children, all of
whom were listed in the registrar's office as white.
Atha married Robert Lee Demery (Raphial) who was born out of wedlock to Lou-
ise Demery and one Raphial, a German immigrant. Louise Demery appeared on various
documents as colored, mulatto, and "no race." Her brothers were also listed as colored.
She was the daughter of Alfred Demery and Elizabeth Watts, both of whom were shown
in the 1870 census as mulatto. The mulatto designation caused each to be termed
negro and Louise, therefore, also to be negro. The union of Raphial (0) who
the registrar assumed was white and Louise ( ) produced Robert Lee Demery,
negro, although, as in other cases, Robert Lee Demery was designated white on his
death certificate. Atha Christophe (15/32) and Robert Lee Demery ( ) had a child,
Lucille Grace Raphial (Mrs. F. Plaia, Jr.), who was 11.5/32 negro. Lucille's brothers
and sisters were listed in the records of the registrar as colored.
At the end of this genealogical maze, Lucille Grace Raphial (11.5/32) married
Frank Joseph Plaia, Jr. (white or 0) and they produced the plaintiff, Elizabeth Maria
Plaia. The registrar computed Elizabeth Maria to be 5.75/32 negro.
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Detecting an error, the registrar flagged the birth certificate. 23 Eliza-
beth's parents sought a birth certificate showing her as white, but the
registrar refused to issue the document because Elizabeth, whose ances-
try was nominally 5.75/32 negro, was considered a full negro under Act
46. The plaintiff sought a writ of mandamus to compel the registrar to
issue the birth certificate. After the trial court denied the application,
the plaintiff appealed. The Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal
GENEALOGICAL CHART OF ELIZABETH MARIA PLAIA*







* State ex rel. Plaia v. Louisiana Bd. of Health, 275 So. 2d at 206.
** The chart and the record do not identify this person.
Registrar's determination appears at the bottom of each box.
23. No birth certificate was issued pursuant to the state board of health's regula-
tions of July 29, 1966, authorizing the registrar to investigate all errors, irregularities
or conflicts which he discovers. Furthermore: "During said investigation [the registrar]
shall suspend issuance of any questionable certificate pending its clarification or correc-
tion." State ex rel. Plaia v. Louisiana Bd. of Health, 275 So. 2d 201, 202, n.2 (La.
App. 1973).
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reversed and rejected the determination made by the registrar since Act
46 specifies neither the method of computation nor the meaning of the
racial terms used in the act. 2a The court pointed out:
The Registrar's problem is ... two-fold. . . . [H]e must under-
take to produce a mathematical result by using an equation consist-
ing of many unknowns, namely, the terms used on old documents
in his possession classifying the ancestors of the child as "colored,"
"mulatto," "French," "mixed race," "brown," which terms are un-
certain insofar as they call for any specific fractions of Negro blood
in the individuals so designated. The other part of the Registrar's
problem is that as he tries to prove what each of these various terms
means in terms of percentage of Negro blood he is operating within
the stringent framework of the Schlumbrecht burden of proof.25
After this decision the board of health issued Elizabeth a "short
form" birth certificate without any racial designation instead of a regular
birth certificate. The plaintiff subsequently sought relief before the
state supreme court to compel compliance with the judgment of the
court of appeal. The supreme court affirmed the appellate court's
ruling that the registrar be compelled to issue a birth certificate designat-
ing Elizabeth as white, but reversed the court's ruling that Act 46 was
unconstitutional. The supreme court rejected the argument that such
terms as black, mulatto and griffe, which are used in the statute were
vague. After pointing out that the appellate court incorrectly assumed
that the act requires the registrar to classify according to the racial terms
used in the statute, the supreme court concluded that Act 46 does not
require the racial classification of any person. Act 46 merely prohibits
the use of such racial terms unless the person described has more than
1/32 negro blood.26 It reads: "In signifying race, a person having one-
thirty second or less of Negro blood shall not be deemed, described or
designated by any public official in the state of Louisiana as 'colored'
"$27
By construing Act 46 only as a prohibition, the court ignored the
affirmative operation of Act 46 in providing the dividing line between
blacks and nonblacks in Louisiana. The court's declaration, in effect,
mandates racial classification; by upholding the statute the court im-
pliedly found the 1/32 test to be reasonable. Futhermore, the board
of health continues to apply Act 46 in the same manner as it did prior to
the Plaia decision despite an emerging awareness of the registrar's
24. Id. at 203.
25. Id. The Schlumbrecht burden of proof requires that the evidence leave "no
doubt at all" as to racial status before a change in birth registration is justified. State
ex rel Schlumbrecht v. Louisiana Bd. of Health, 231 So. 2d 730, 732 (La. App. 1970);
see note 70 infra.
26. State ex rel. Plaia v. Louisiana Bd. of Health, 296 So. 2d 809, 810 (La. 1974).
27. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 42:267 (Supp. 23A, 1975) (emphasis added).
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inability to determine a person's fractional percentage of negro blood
with precision.28 Even if such a minute computation is realistically
possible, the question remains: What legislative purpose is served by
classification to the thirty-second degree?29 In the absence of any
legislative history, 0 there is no way to determine the underlying purpose
of Act 46. However, based on Act 46 Louisiana may legally designate
as black thousands of persons who appear to be white. For example,
the plaintiffs in Thomas, Messina and Plaia who were determined to
have 2.5/32, 3/32 and 5.75/32 negro blood, respectively, clearly have
nondiscernible portions of negro blood.
11. Louisiana's Racial Designations: Past and Present
While the stated legislative purpose of Act 46 of 1970 is "to define
'colored,' 'mulatto,' 'black' . . . when such terms are used to signify the
race of a person by any public official in the state of Louisiana," ' the
Louisiana Supreme Court in Plaia articulated its own view of the
legislative purpose of the act:
A reasonable explanation of the legislative purpose of the act is
that it was a definition, not of the terms indicated in the title, but
of the phrase, "traceable amount," formerly of legal significance in
racial designation in this State.3 2
The court's supposition that the purpose of Act 46 was to define a racial
term of prior legal significance makes the history of racial designation in
Louisiana relevant to an understanding of any contemporary purpose or
application of the act. During various periods, a variety of terms have
been used to designate persons of mixed racial background. Early
judicial determinations regarding these terms may pose great difficulties
28. The counsel for the Louisiana Board of Health, in response to a letter of in-
quiry dated Sept. 26, 1975, stated: "The Act is still being used by the Board of Health
because it is still state law and the same applies to the regulations of 1970." The coun-
sel further replied: "Act 46 of 1970 has presented an almost impossible situation as far
as keeping accurate statistics as to race in the State of Louisiana and it appears that
the courts either will not or do not want to understand the unconstitutional structure
of Act 46 of 1970, which is vague and indefinite and furnishes no definition or guide-
lines for the use of the terms contained therein." Letter from James P. Screen, Gen-
eral Counsel, Louisiana Health and Human Resources Administration, to author, Oct.
21, 1975 [hereinafter cited as CORRESPONDENCE] (Letters on file in the offices of the
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAw QUARTERLY.).
29. Could there be a discriminatory motive behind such a statute? Cf. Brest,
Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative
Motive, 1971 Sup. Cr. REv. 95.
30. No legislative history to the enactment of Act 46 of 1970 has been found in
the legislative counsel's office in Louisiana.
31. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 42:267 (Supp. 23A, 1975). This statement appears
as the preface to the statute.
32. 296 So. 2d at 810.
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in a present-day determination that an individual is negro under Act 46.
Furthermore, the definitional problem is compounded by an evidentiary
one in that the early records designating one's race are often confusing,
inaccurate or missing altogether.
A. "Colored:" A Mixed Racial Designation
In Louisiana during the late 1800's the word "colored," defined as
those persons having "an admixture of negro blood,' 33 was used in the
state's "Jim Crow" railroad law which required railroad companies to
provide equal, but separate, accomodations for the white and colored
races.34 In Plessy v. Ferguson,"5 the Louisiana railroad accomodations
law was challenged by a Louisiana resident who was 7/8 caucasian and
1/8 negro. The United States Supreme Court held that the Louisiana
law did not violate the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, and
that a statute which created merely a legal distinction between the white
and colored races had no tendency to destroy the legal equality of the
two races."6 While the Court asserted that this inherent racial distinc-
tion "must always exist so long as white men are distinguished from the
other race by color," 7 the Court also questioned the allegation
that the plaintiffs portion of negro blood was nondiscernible.3 8 There-
fore, the racial segregation which the Court upheld was not only that
based upon observable physical characteristics but that based upon non-
observable genealogical heritage as well.
During this period some courts began to question the practice of
ascribing fractions of negro blood to persons. In State v. Treadaway,3 9
two defendants were accused of violating Lousiana's Act 87 of 1908
which prohibited the cohabitation and concubinage between persons of
the caucasian and the negro race.4 0  The indictment charged that one of
33. State v. Treadaway, 126 La. 300, 305, 52 So. 500, 502 (1910); Lee v. New
Orleans Great Northern Ry., 125 La. 236, 238, 51 So. 182, 183 (1910).
34. La. Act No. 111 of 1890, at 152 (repealed 1972); see Plessy v. Ferguson, 163
U.S. 537, 540-41 (1896).
35. 163 U.S. 537 (1896), affg Ex parte Plessy, 45 La. Ann. 80, 11 So. 948
(1892), rev'd, Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
36. 163 U.S. at 543; accord, Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). Mr. Justice
Bradley stated: "It would be running the slavery argument into the ground, to make it
apply to every act of discrimination...." 109 U.S. at 24.
37. 163 U.S. at 543 (emphasis added).
38. Id. at 541. The Court did not question whether the plaintiff was colored, but
noted: "Under the allegations of his petition it may undoubtedly become a question of
importance whether, under the laws of Louisiana, the petitioner belongs to the white or
colored race." Id. at 552. The question remains whether the Supreme Court will al-
ways defer to a state's definition of race.
39. 126 La. 300, 52 So. 500 (1910).
40. "Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the state of Louisiana, that concubi-
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the defendants was a caucasian and the other a negro, "to wit, an
octoroon. '' 41 The issue was whether an octoroon or any person having
a specific percentage of negro blood was "a person of the negro race'
within the meaning of the statute. The contention of the prosecution
was that the word "negro" was synonymous with the word "colored."
The state supreme court disagreed. According to the court, the word
"negro" was never adopted for the purpose of designating persons of
mixed blood. On the contrary, it was for the sole purpose of indicating
persons of the negro race per se.42 The court found no authority in
which the word "negro" or the term "a person of the negro race" had
been given a meaning which would include an octoroon, and, still less, a
person of 15/16 white and 1/16 negro blood, or 31/32 white and 1/32
negro blood. 8 The court continued:
If [we] were to declare that -the popular meaning of the word
"negro" embraces octoroons, the decision would furnish the one sol-
nage between a person of the Caucasian or white race and a person of the negro or
black race is hereby made a felony, and whoever shall be convicted thereof in any court
of competent jurisdiction shall for each offense be sentenced to imprisonment at the dis-
cretion of the court for a term of not less than one month nor more than one year with
or without hard labor." La. Act No. 87 of 1908, § 1 (repealed 1942); see State v.
Treadaway, 126 La. 300, 52 So. 500 (1910).
41. If the word "octoroon" is to be understood in its technical sense, a person with
7/s white blood in his veins and Ya negro blood is IN white and % negro.
The following diagram will clarify this designation:
III G.G.F. G.G.M. G.G.F. G.G.M. G.G.F. G.G.M. G.G.F. G.G.M.
A B C D E F G a
IIG.F. G.M. G.E. G.M.




Suppose it is desired to ascertain the fraction of negro blood of the son X. The first
generation above him is that of his parents, M and N. The second generation is that
of his grandparents, I, J, K and L. The third generation is that of his great-grandpar-
ents, A, B, C, D, E, F, G and H. If any one of these eight great-grandparents is a ne-
gro, X has % negro blood. Suppose, for instance, the great-grandfather, A, was a
negro and all the rest of the great-grandparents were white. The grandfather, I,
would be half negro; the father, M, would be 4 negro; and X would be % negro.
Thus though of the fourteen progenitors of X only three had negro blood, X would
nevertheless be % negro. G. STEPHENSON, RAcE, DIsTINCTIONs IN AMERICAN LAw 18-19
(1910).
42. 126 La. at 323, 52 So. at 509.
43. Id. at 305, 52 So. at 502.
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itary instance in legal or any other literature where the word had
been given that meaning. The judges of this court do not know
that the word has that meaning. 44
Reversing the defendants' convictions, the court concluded that mulat-
toes, quadroons and octoroons were not included in the term "negro."
Statutes expressly using the word "negro" did not include persons of
mixed blood who were properly labeled colored. Furthermore, the
terms mulatto and colored did not imply any specific percentage of
negro blood.45
The Treadavay court's reasoning presents a bizarre twist to the
enactment of Act 46 of 1970. Ironically, the author of the 1908 anti-
cohabitation statute included the following clause in his original draft:
"[A] person who is as much as one thirty-second part negro shall be,
for the purpose of this act, a person of the negro race."4 6 However, the
1908 legislature struck out the clause before the act was passed. The
Treadaway court considered the legislature's intent behind the deletion:
If the act was intended to [apply to mulattoes or quadroons or oc-
toroons] certainly the clause could do no harm. The negro blood
is barely traceable beyond the 1/16, and certainly not beyond the
1/32. The reason for striking out this clause could not, then, have
been for the purpose of extending its application to persons having
less than 1/32 part of negro blood. And, if the object of striking
out that clause was not to extend the application of the act, what
could it have been, if not to restrict its application? 47
Thus, in 1910 the word "negro" in its ordinary acceptance and by court
interpretation did not include persons of mixed blood. While it is clear
that ancestral lines were traced to determine an individual's race, the
court and by implication the legislature recognized the practical limita-
tions in tracing an individual's genealogy.
B. "Person of Color:" Not Always a Reference to Negro Blood
Around 1930 some courts began to apply the term "person of
color," defined as those persons having "a traceable amount of negro
blood," to delimit Louisiana's anti-miscegenation statutes.48 The trace-
able amount test continued to be used throughout the sixties in inter-
preting Louisiana's birth registration statutes.4 9 As used, "traceable
amount" referred to any ascertainable portion of negro blood.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 32-5, 52 So. at 501-02; accord, State ex rel. Plaia v. Louisiana Bd.
of Health, 275 So. 2d 201, 203 (La. App. 1973).
46. 126 La. at 329, 52 So. at 510.
47. Id. at 329-30, 52 So. at 510 (emphasis added).
48. Sunseri v. Cassagne, 191 La. 209, 211, 185 So. 1, 2 (1938).
49. State ex rel. Lytell v. Louisiana Bd. of Health, 153 So. 2d 498 (La. App.
1963).
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However, the term "person of color" has not always been defined
to mean a traceable amount of negro blood. In 1938, in Sunseri v.
Cassagne,0 the plaintiff husband, a caucasian, brought suit to annul
his marriage on the ground that his wife was a person of color having a
traceable amount of negro blood and that such marriage was prohibited
under Article 94 of the Louisiana Civil Code.5 The trial judge found
that since the defendant had 1/16 negro blood her marriage to the white
plaintiff was null and void, because the law did not permit marriage
between persons of the white race and persons having a trace of negro
blood. The trial court's finding was based on evidence in the notarial
records in which the defendant's great, great, grandmother was de-
scribed as "F.C.L." meaning "Femme Couleur Libre" and "F.W.C."
meaning "Free Woman of Color." The defendant insisted that the
certificates were incorrect, claiming that she was of Indian descent.
The state supreme court reversed the trial court's decision, finding
that the description "Free Woman of Color" in 1847 and 1857 did not
preclude the possibility that the defendant's ancestor was of the Indian
race. The court cited as authority a statement made by the court in
1910 in Lee v. New Orleans Great Northern Railway:
One hundred years ago in the territory of Orleans, the term "per-
sons of color" was used to designate people who were neither white
nor black. In Adelle v. Beauregard. . . decided in 1810, the Su-
perior Court said: "Persons of color may have descended from In-
dians on both sides, from a white parent, or mulatto parents in pos-
session of freedom." 52
The term "person of color," up to the time of the Civil War, was applied
to all persons who were not of the white race. The court remanded the
case, holding that the defendant should be given an opportunity to show
the incorrectness of the records, since her marriage should not be
annulled on such grounds unless the evidence leaves no room for
doubt.53
Apparently it was easier for courts to construe statutory terms by
determining those persons who were excluded rather than those were
included. Thus, courts found that the term "negro" did not include
those who had a specific percentage of negro blood and that the term
50. 191 La. 209, 185 So. 1 (1938), aff'd mem., 195 La. 19, 196 So. 7 (1940).
51. "Marriage between white persons and persons of color is prohibited, and the
celebration of all such marriages is forbidden and such celebration carries with it no
effect and is null and void." La. Act. No. 54 of 1894, as amended LA. CIV. CODE ANN.
art. 94 (Supp. 1975).
52. Sunseri v. Cassagne, 191 La. 209, 217-18, 185 So. 1, 4 (1938); Lee v. Great
Northern Ry., 125 La. 236, 51 So. 182 (1910); Adelle v. Beauregard, 1 La. 99 (1810).
53. After the evidence was taken on remand, the case was again argued and the
court held that the certificate reflected the true state of facts, which showed that the
defendant had a traceable amount of negro blood. 195 La. at 27, 196 So. at 9.
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"person of color" was not conclusive proof that one had a traceable
amount of negro blood.
C. More Than One Thirty-second Negro Blood
Unlike the admixture and traceable amount tests, Act 46 has not
been used to determine those persons who are not negro, although
expressly required by the terms of the statute and despite the court's
assertion in Plaia. Rather, officials have used it affirmatively to classify
as negro those persons with more than 1/32 negro blood.54 A cursory
analysis of Act 46 suggests three problems: 1) the statute does not
apply to all races; 2) there is no scientific or political basis for such a
definition; and 3) the designation of one as negro who appears to be
white is inherently unreasonable.
First, Act 46 is discriminatory since it applies only to the negro
race. Although Act 46 merely excludes from the definition of negro all
those persons having less than 1/32 negro blood, by implication all
those persons having more than 1/32 negro blood are included in the
definition. But the act does not establish a precise mathematical formu-
la for all races, nor does any comparable Louisiana statute exist requir-
ing the racial classification of caucasians or asians to be established to a
mathematical certainty. This may violate the equal protection clause of
the United States Constitution. 55 Act 46 may also be invidiously dis-
criminatory because it implies racial inferiority. Given the history of
racial discrimination in Louisiana, the rule that 1.5/32's will control
30.5/32's can only be understood as an official statement that negro
ancestry is a taint which must be traced.
Second, the statutory definition of negro used in Act 46 does not
correspond to any scientific or political definition. Though anthropolo-
gists, biologists and population geneticists may differ in their categoriza-
tion, none have sought to classify according to ancestral designation.56
54. See note 28 supra.
55. This is essentially the argument espoused by Justice Barham in his dissenting
opinion in Plaia: "Any formula which is discriminatory in determining the race for the
purpose of a birth certificate is in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution. The jurisprudential 'traceable amount' formula applied only
to the Negro race is equally as repugnant as is the act which we consider." 296 So. 2d
at 812-13.
56. See generally, R. BENEDICT, RACE: SCIENCE AND POLITcS (rev. ed. 1959); L.
CAVALLI-SFoRZA AND W. BODMER, THE GENETICS OF HUMAN POPULATIONS (1971); S.
COLE, RACES OF MAN (2d ed. 1965); 0. Cox, CASTE, CLASS, & RACE (1948); S. GARN,
HUMAN RACES (2d ed. 1965); T. GossEr, RACE (1963); P. ROSE, THEY AND WE
(1964); SCIENCE AND THE CONCEPT OF RACE .(M. Mead, T. Dobzhansky, E. Tobach,
and R. Light eds. 1968); THIS Is RACE (E. Count ed. 1950); Lundsgaarde, Racial and
Ethnic Classifications: An Appraisal of the Rule of Anthropology in the Lawmaking
Process, 10 HOuST. L. REv. 641 nn.22-25 (1973); Osborne, The History and Nature of
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Political entities have, of course, used fictional "blood lines" to define
race, but have done so to a limited measure, usually not reaching more
than the 1/8 fraction. "7  Even the stringent definition along ancestral
lines enacted in Germany prior to World War II was not carried to the
thirty-second degree. 5 s
Third, Act 46 may be termed inherently unreasonable.59 What
valid state purpose is served by designating a person as negro under Act
46 who visually appears to be white? Classification to the 1/32 degree
could have a valid purpose if it would aid in the determination of
whether that individual had a propensity towards sickle cell anemia and
should therefore be required to take a sickle cell anemia test. Absent
such a purpose or absent an equal concern with ethno-specific diseases,
it is absurd to designate a person as negro where visually he or she
appears to be caucasian.
On the other hand, it is the function of the legislature to draw lines
and make definitions. If, for example, the legislature deems a chair to
be an "apple," what harm has been done? It is merely a change in
description without a change in status. The change in description does
not alter the reality of the chair. Thus, if the legislature deems one who
Race Classification, in THE BIOLOGICAL AND SOCIAL MEANING OF RACE 163 (R. Osborne
ed. 1971).
57. See notes 3 & 41 supra.
58. Adolph Hitler's regime passed the Law for the Protection of German Blood
and Honor, enacted on Sept. 15, 1935, prohibiting marriages and sexual intercourse be-
tween Jews and citizens of German or related blood under the age of 45. It further
provided that only persons of German or related blood could be citizens. None of the
terms used were defined in the decree.
The First Regulation under the Reich Citizenship Law went into effect on Nov. 14,
1935. Under the regulations a Jew was anyone who (1) was descended from at least
three Jewish grandparents (full Jews and three-quarter Jews), or (2) descended from two
Jewish grandparents (half-Jews) and (a) belonged to the Jewish religious community
on Sept. 15, 1935, or joined the community on a subsequent date, or (b) was married
to a Jewish person on Sept. 15, 1935, or married one on a subsequent date, or (c) was
the offspring of a marriage contracted with a three-quarter or a full Jew after the Law
for the Protection of German Blood and Honor had come into force (Sept. 15, 1935),
or (d) was the offspring of an extramarital relationship with a three-quarter or a full
Jew, and was born out of wedlock after July 31, 1936. For the determination of the
status of the grandparents, a presumption arose that the grandparent was Jewish if he
or she belonged to the Jewish religious community. R. HILBERG, Tn DESTRUCTION OF
THE EUROPEAN JEWS 46-48 (1961).
59. Act 46 resembles one of Professor Schwartz's examples of an inherently unrea-
sonable classification. Schwartz hypothesizes a statute which applies to red-haired mak-
ers of margarine. A classification which turns upon hair color %&ould be ruled contrary
to equal protection. Red things may logically be associated in a separate class for cer-
tain purposes, but the classification would be bad if it failed to haze a reasonable relation
to the purpose of the particular law. Such classification would be found to be inher-
ently unreasonable. B. SCHWARTZ, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 292-93 (1972).
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is visually white to be a negro, no harm should result from this change
in terminology. °
This reasoning is faulty in two respects. First, the 1/32 classifica-
tion belies reality. The Louisiana legislature does not act in a vacuum,
but within a national and world community that generally defines things
as they are commonly perceived. It is unreasonable to designate a chair
as an "apple" where it is known to others throughout the community as
a chair. Second, Act 46 does not label chairs or apples, but people.
Such an unrealistic classification of persons can have serious adverse
cultural and social effects.
Despite the manifest absurdity of the 1/32 test embodied in Act
46, as long as the act remains merely definitional it may survive consti-
tutional attack. A potential litigant would find it difficult to demon-
strate an injury which resulted solely from being classified as "negro"
under the act. But is Act 46 merely used to classify?
M. Act 46 Plus . . .
The Louisiana Board of Health has used Act 46 since its passage in
1970 to designate race on birth certificates. While the state supreme
court in Plaia concluded that the board of health was not required to
take action based on terms used in Act 46, positive action has been
required under other statutes and regulations. Like the former stan-
dards defining race, Act 46 is utilized when a public official must
comply with a statute which requires racial classification."' In the
seventies the 1/32 test operates under the following statutory scheme.
The state registrar must maintain birth certificates.6" A certificate must
be filed recording the births of persons born in the state of Louisiana,63
and one must be classified according to race.0 4 The birth registration
must also bear the racial designation of both parents.6 5
60. See, e.g., San Francisco Chronicle, Nov. 10, 1975, at 1, col. 6, entitled, "Dog
Turned into Cat":
Oxford England
The Dean of Worcester College has found an unusual way of getting around
ancient rules that bar dogs from his college.
The governing body voted last week that his dog, Flint, is a cat.
61. La. Act No. 151, § 4 of 1914, as amended, LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:224 (re-
pealed 1972); cf. La. Act No. 54 of 1894, as amended L.& CIv. CODE ANN. art. 94
(1952) (Supp. 1, 1975). See text accompanying notes 33-53 supra.
62. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:149 (1965). See also LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:
151-53 (1965) (regarding duties of local registrars).
63. LA. REa. STAT. ANN. § 40:302 (1965).
64. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:244(11) (1965); cf. IA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:
246(3) (1965) (death certificates); IA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:306(4) (1965) (regis-
tration of foundlings); cf. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:261(2) (1965) (marriage licenses).
65. IA. Rnv. STAT. ANN. § 40:244(11) (1965).
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The registrar does not make the initial determination as to the facts
on the certificate. The physician, midwife or person acting as midwife
files the birth certificate with the local registrar. 6 However, the regis-
trar has a duty to make a diligent inquiry regarding the information
called for on the certificate. It is his duty to secure such information as
will enable him to prepare an accurate birth certificate. 7 The registrar
is also aided by office records of genealogy. By statute persons in
possession of any records of births or deaths in the parish of Orleans
may file such records with the local registrar.0 8  At its completion and
upon its filing, the birth certificate constitutes prima facie evidence of
-the facts stated therein 9 and cannot be changed unless the plaintiff
shows that there is "no doubt at all" as to his racial status.70
66. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:304 (1965).
67. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:260 (1965); see LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:267
(1965) (A penalty is imposed against any individual who fails to furnish correctly vital
information requested by the registrar).
68. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:260 (1965).
69. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:159 (1965).
70. The evolution of this principal began with Sunseri v. Cassagne, 191 La. 209,
185 So. 1 (1938), where it was asserted that a marriage should not be annulled because
one of the parties was a negro, unless the evidence left "no room for doubt" that such
was the case. Subsequently, in State ex rel. Treadaway v. Louisiana Bd. of Health, 56
So. 2d 249 (La. App. 1952), the court stated that vital statistics cannot be changed un-
less the proof leaves "no doubt at all." On appeal, the Louisiana Supreme Court, af-
firmed the ruling and unequivocally stated its policy regarding the inviolability of official
birth records: "mhe records kept by the Registrar are vital to the general public wel-
fare. The registration of a birthright must be given as much sanctity in the law as the
registration of a property right." 221 La. 1047, 1059, 61 So. 2d 735, 739 (1952). See,
e.g., State ex rel. Schlumbrecht v. Louisiana Bd. of Health, 231 So. 2d 730 (La. App.
1970); State ex rel. Pritchard v. Louisiana Bd. of Health, 198 So. 2d 490 (La. App.
1967); State ex rel. Cousin v. Louisiana Bd. of Health, 138 So. 2d 829 (La. App. 1962);
Green v. City of New Orleans, 88 So. 2d 76 (La. App. 1956).
Under this rule, records are almost conclusively presumed correct. Professor Pugh
points out that in order for the relator to have his racial classification changed, he must
establish his case by not merely a preponderance of the evidence, nor even beyond a
reasonable doubt (the test required in criminal cases), but rather he must establish it
beyond any doubt at all. Pugh suggests that the Louisiana courts have consistently mis-
applied the language of the cases which purportedly established the "no doubt at all"
precedent: "With deference, it is submitted that to accord these Public Health records
such an august and sacrosanct position is unwarranted, and not in keeping with the leg-
islation [.A. REV. STAT. Am. § 40:159 (1965), that certificates on file are prima facie
evidence of the facts stated] and the jurisprudence taken in its entirety. To give such
an administrative classification as to race, arrived at without notice and hearing, the
status of practically a rule of law seems an undue obeisance to bureaucratic records-
one which might well be in violation of the due process of law requirements of the
fourteenth amendment." Pugh, Evidence, Burden of Proof: "No Doubt at All," 29
LA. L. REv. 310, 311 (1969).
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A. Tracing Genealogical Lines
The registrar traces an individual's genealogical lines and ascribes
percentages to prior racial designations. 71  Evidence of the registrant's
racial lineage is found in succession records, suit records, various decen-
nial census records, birth, baptismal, marriage and death records span-
ning six or more generations and dating back more than one hundred
years. 72 The registrar's determination of the proportion of negro blood
is based on traditional racial percentage classifications which are rather
imprecise. The assumptions underlying these classifications are that a
person who was designated as negro is in all cases 100 percent negro,
that a person designated as mulatto is Y negro, and that a person
designated as quadroom is Y4 negro.17 Act 46 nonetheless requires
exactness in the calculation.74
Although the statute sets forth the specific mathematical fraction
defining who is to be classified as negro, nowhere does it provide the
state registrar with a means to arrive at that fraction. Also, it provides
no guidance concerning the fraction applicable to the ancestor of an
individual whose race is described by one of the terms mentioned in the
statute.75 By linking all of the racial designations together, the statute
appears to imply that all such terms are synonymous with the term
"negro." However, as seen from the language of Treadaway,76 mulatto
and negro have different meanings. Furthermore, the term "person of
color" is not a reliable indication that the person had negro ancestors. 77
If Act 46 did purport to include non-negro ancestors, the contemporary
determination that a person is negro would be completely irrational.
In Thomas the court found that the board of health did not utilize
predetermined guidelines in ascribing racial percentages to persons.78
71. Messina v. Ciaccio, 290 So. 2d 339, 341-42 (La. App. 1974).
72. Thomas v. Louisiana Bd. of Health, 278 So. 2d 915, 916 (La. App. 1973).
73. Messina v. Ciaccio, 290 So. 2d 339, 341 (La. App. 1974).
74. Id. Under the traceable amount test used prior to the 1/32 test there was an
unstated "more or less" which was a part of the definition. Such latitude was formerly
acceptable in view of the flexibility which the prior test afforded. 290 So. 2d at 341.
For example, in State ex rel. Lytell v. Louisiana Bd. of Health, 153 So. 2d 498 (La.
App. 1963), the court traced the genealogical lines of the relator back to his grandfather
and paternal aunt using the federal census of 1870 and 1880 which listed them as mulat-
toes. It was not necessary to determine that the relator had a specific quantity of negro
blood; all that was needed was evidence that the relator had a portion of negro blood
which could be traced from his parentage. However, under the test of Act 46, it is nec-
essary that each person in an individual's genealogical line be attributed with a specific
fraction of negro blood.
75. Brief for Defendant-Appellee at 3, State ex rel. Plaia v. Louisiana Bd. of
Health, 296 So. 2d 809 (La. 1974).
76. 126 La. 300, 52 So. 500 (1910). See text accompanying notes 39-47 supra.
77. See text accompanying notes 50-53 supra.
78. The testimony in Thomas of Ms. Mary Mugnier demonstrates that the registrar
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Ms. Mary Mugnier, an employee of the board of health who helped
formulate the percentages in Thomas, also prepared the genealogical
chart in Plaia.79 She admitted that the racial designations such as
"mulatto" were often incorrect and, in fact, were at times not even used
by the board to evaluate race. Furthermore, she conceded that if the
determination of full negro, % negro or IA negro was changed in
either direction, the entire calculation would be changed. 80 The per-
centage of negro blood in an individual's lineage could vary greatly if a
distant ancestor, although designated in lay terms as a "Free Person of
Color," thereby implying that the person was 100 percent negro under
Act 46, was, in fact, a person having less than 100 percent negro
blood.8' Moreover, the statute establishing the 1/32 test makes no
provision for persons who are, for example, 15/16 negro or 5/8 negro
but nevertheless have been classified as mulatto or quadroon by their
own designation or by various public officials, clergymen or census
takers.8 2
B. Inaccuracy of Documents
Not only does the registrar have an intractable task in ascribing
racial percentages to distant ancestors but doubt has been cast on the
validity of the racial terms placed on various documents. In State ex
rel. Schlumbrecht v. Louisiana State Board of Health,83 there were
numerous instances in which ancestors were designated white, free
person of color, mulatto and colored on various records. In some
customarily made his fractional determinations through the common usage of such terms
as "mulatto" and "quadroon" after the passage of Act 46:
Q. I'm talking about the word "mulatto" which I think is French. What is
your source to give that percentage? If you say mulatto is one half and
quadroon is one quarter, where do you derive this? What is your au-
thority?
A. This is the concenus (sic) of opinion.Q. Where?
A. General opinion.Q. At your office?
A. And then, of course, the very term itself. Quadroon is a quarter.
Q. Before you said mulatto signified one half.
A. Yes, that is the general understanding of it..Q. Do you make these determinations from any administrative procedure or
rules within your department?
A. Well, together with Mr. Ciccio (sic) and Mr. Screen we usually collaborate
on those.
278 So. 2d at 916-17.
79. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 8, State ex rel. Plaia v. Louisiana Bd. of Health,
275 So. 2d 201 (La. App. 1973) (citing to the trial record at 48).
80. Id. (citing to the trial record at 85-102).
81. Messina v. Ciaccio, 290 So. 2d 339, 341 (La. App. 1974).
82. Id.
83. 231 So. 2d 730 (La. App.), cert. denied, 256 La. 69, 235 So. 2d 97 (1970).
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instances children born of the same parents received differing racial
designations. The court stated that such inconsistencies suggest that
the terms were "in at least some instances incorrectly used by the person
or persons responsible for the racial entries made in the public
records.)
8 4
Moreover, allowing a parent to designate the race of an offspring
certainly does not ensure the accuracy of such a determination.85  Even
a term which in its common usage may be thought to define one as
having part negro blood may be inaccurate.8 6 Not only is the designa-
tion subject to error, but persons in the registrar's office tampering with
the birth records have created individual inaccuracies as well.8
7
Green v. City of New Orleans8 best illustrates the problem of
inaccurate birth records. Ruby Henley Preuc, a white woman, gave
birth to a female child. The child's father was unknown. The mother's
sister, who cared for the child until the mother's death, later had the
child placed in a negro foster home, stating to the department of welfare
that the child was a negro and that she could no longer permit her to
remain in her home. The plaintiff, a negro, endeavored to adopt the
child who was certified as white. He sought a writ of mandamus to
compel the agency to change the child's racial designation so that he
could adopt the child.89 Ms. Emma Smith, an employee of Charity
Hospital assigned to birth registration and a key witness in the manda-
mus proceeding, was asked if she had questioned the mother as to the
race of the child's father. Ms. Smith responded, "No, if she is a white
mother. We do not ask if her husband is white, we take it for granted
he is white." 90  The certificate prepared by Ms. Smith ultimately
became the birth record for the department of public health. Even
though the validity of the racial designation was doubtful, the court
concluded that the evidence was not sufficient to change the birth
84. Id. at 732. The court took judicial notice that the designation, "free woman
of color," did not necessarily mean that one was a negro. See text accompanying notes
50-53 supra.
85. Villa v. Lacoste, 213 La. 654, 35 So. 2d 419 (1948) (Filipino registering her
daughter and granddaughter as colored, under the erroneous belief that persons of Fili-
pino extraction were "colored").
86. State ex rel. Cousin v. Louisiana Bd. of Health, 138 So. 2d 829 (La. App.
1962) (person designated "creole" determined to be of Spanish or French lineage).
87. Cline v. City of New Orleans, 207 So. 2d 856 (La. App. 1968) (unauthorized
alteration of birth certificate by unknown official held invalid).
88. 88 So. 2d 76 (La. App. 1956).
89. "A single person over the age of twenty-one years, or a married couple jointly,
may petition to adopt any child of his or their race." La. Act No. 228, § 2 of 1948,
as amended LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:422 (Supp. 3, 1976). See In re Spraggins, 234
So. 2d 462 (La. App. 1970) (Statutory requirements for adoption must be strictly carried
out).
90. 88 So. 2d at 78.
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certificate from white to negro, and therefore the child could not be
adopted by the plaintiff. The court accepted the determination made
by the hospital official founded not on fact but on mere speculation.91
C. Inaccuracy of Federal Census Records
The use of federal census records to trace genealogy and to deter-
mine an individuars racial background has also been questioned. Re-
ports of a person's race may often conflict from census to census. The
census records of 1850 and 1860 had three classifications: white, black
and mulatto.92 For the years 1870 and 1880 there were five classifica-
tions: white, black, mulatto, Chinese and Indian. 93  The census records
do not specify the percentage of negro blood, nor do they indicate how
the terms were applied in the field reports.9 4 While census reports have
been considered in making the racial determination, they are not in
themselves conclusive.95 The inaccuracy of the census records must be
considered in an effort to justly evaluate cases of this nature.96 The
court in Schlumbrecht recognized such inconsistencies in the use of
former documents: "[Ihe confusion and contradiction appear[ing] on
the very face of the documents makes the conclusion self-evident that
some of these records are obviously incorrect." 97
It should be noted that it is a violation of federal law to use the
federal census to the detriment of the individual to whom such informa-
tion relates.98  While copies of census reports cannot, without the
consent of the individual concerned, be admitted as evidence in any suit
or other judicial or administrative proceeding,99 the Louisiana Court of
Appeal has held that such federal laws do not extend to the use of a
census report by the state board of health in defense of its own
records. 00 The plaintiff is thus precluded from having the census
91. Id. at 81 (Janvier, J., dissenting).
92. POPULATION OF TH UNITED STATES, SEVENTH CENSUS (1853); POPULATION OF
THE UNITED STATES, EIGHTH CENSUS (1864).
93. POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES, NINTH CENSUS (1872); POPULATION OF
THE UNITED STATES, TENTH CENSUS (1885).
94. Thomas v. Louisiana Bd. of Health, 278 So. 2d 915, 916 (La. App. 1973).
95. State ex rel. Schlumbrecht v. Louisiana Bd. of Health, 231 So. 2d 730, 732 (La.
App. 1970); Soulet v. City of New Orleans, 94 So. 2d 108 (La. App. 1957).
96. Thomas v. Louisiana Bd. of Health, 278 So. 2d 915 (La. App. 1973); State
ex rel. Francis v. Louisiana Bd. of Health, 179 So. 2d 681 (La. App. 1965); Soulet v.
City of New Orleans, 94 So. 2d 108, 115 (La. App. 1957).
97. 231 So. 2d 730, 733 (La. App. 1970).
98. 13 U.S.C. § 8(c) (1970).
99. 13 U.S.C. § 9(a) (1970).
100. "We find no Federal decision that such records cannot be used by a sovereign
state in defense of its own vital statistics records, when the integrity of the latter is at-
tacked by one claiming immunity under the Federal Statutes." State ex rel. Lutell v.
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reports declared inadmissible. Although the admittedly inaccurate
records are not conclusive, their use by the board of health is still
permitted in defending its racial determinations.
Even though no fractions attached to the classifications at the time
the data was collected, the registrar subsequently-as late as one
hundred years thereafter-attaches a fraction to the racial designation
of a person's great, great, great grandparent. It is suggested that this is
an improper use of these records under Louisiana law. First, attaching
percentages to previous racial designations cannot be squared with the
decisions of Treadaway'0' and Sunseri.10 2 Second, since the birth certifi-
icate cannot be changed unless there is no doubt at all as to the racial
designation, 03 the former documents and census records no longer
constitute prima facie evidence but become conclusive proof of an
individual's ancestry.
It is clear that Act 46 is of no significance unless coupled with
other statutes which require positive action. However, the court in Plaia
failed to note that several statutes and regulations do exist which require
racial classification. While the court stated that "required information
to be shown on this [birth] certificate is detailed in R.S. 40:244,''110 it
did not enunciate that racial classification is part of that required infor-
mation. The court has endeavored to skirt the constitutional issue by its
strict interpretation of the act and its academic discussion as to whether
Act 46 requires positive action. Where Act 46 interacts with birth
registration statutes, it may result in arbitrary and unreasonable classifi-
cations on a birth certificate.
D. Harms under Act 46
However arbitrary and unreasonable the implementation of Act 46,
in order to have standing to challenge the statute a plaintiff must have
suffered a legally cognizable harm. Such a harm may result when an
individual's birth certificate is withheld under the following procedure.
When a discrepancy arises between the facts as stated on the birth
registration by the person who filed the certificate and the registrar, the
birth certificate is not issued. After presentation of sufficient evidence,
the city health authorities must refuse certificates which are known to be
incorrect'0 5 although the registrar may delay issuance of a certificate if
Louisiana Bd. of Health, 153 So. 2d 498, 500 (La. App. 1963) accord, State ex rel.
Pritchard v. Louisiana Bd. of Health, 198 So. 2d 490, 494 (La. App. 1967).
101. 126 La. 300, 52 So. 500 (1910).
102. 191 La. 209, 185 So. 1 (1938).
103. See note 70 supra.
104. 296 So. 2d at 810.
105. Op. LA. Arr'y GEN., Aug. 22, 1967 (unpublished); see IA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 40:149 (Supp. 23, 1975).
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conflicting information exists. 10 6 However, no certificate or record may
be altered except upon submission of documentary or sworn evidence
providing a sufficient basis for the alteration.10 7  The board of health is
empowered to make regulations "necessary to the installation and effi-
cient performance of an adequate system of vital statistics."' 08 In order
to comply with Act 46, the board adopted certain regulations by which
the registrar is permitted to withhold issuance of any birth certificate
where the registrant may have "a traceable amount of negro blood."'' 0 9
106. La. Bd. of Health, Regs. of July 29, 1966, as amended, REGs. oF JAN. 30, 1971;
see note 109 infra.
107. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:266 (1965).
108. A. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:143 (1965).
109. Regs. for Enforcement of Act 46 of 1970:
"These regulations supplement and amend those adopted by the Board on October 8,
1947 and July 29, 1966 for the efficient administration of the State Vital Statistics Act,
and in order to implement the provisions of Act 46 of 1970, all in accordance with the
provisions and authority of R.S. 40:143; which regulations were adopted under pro-
cedures of the Louisiana Administrative Procedure Act, R.S. 49:951, et seq.
"1. The State Registrar shall strictly enforce the following rules and regulations
throughout the State of Louisiana with respect to all certificates of birth and death filed,
or which shall be filed, in his office, in the office of any deputy registrar, and in the
office of the Registrar of Vital Statistics of the City of New Orleans.
"2. On the face of each and every certificate of any registrant having a traceable
amount of Negro blood, according to available evidence, the State Registrar shall stamp,
with a rubber stamp, in red ink, beneath or adjacent to the confidential section of said
certificate in bold letters the words: 'Do Not Issue Any Copy Until Cleared Under Act
46 of 1970 by State Registrar.'
"3. When a copy of said certificate is applied for it shall be checked against the
evidence in the possession of the State Registrar, or which has been submitted to him,
to determine if said evidence is applicable to the registrant or his ancestors.
"4. If said evidence is not applicable it shall be so noted in the confidential section
by the State Registrar in red ink and dated and signed with his original signature and
no restrictions shall thereafter be applicable to said certificate unless newly discovered
evidence is produced.
"5. If, after checking, said evidence appears to be applicable to the registrant, he,
or his next of kin in case of death, shall be notified directly, or through his parents
if a minor, and notified of a date and time to examine said findings in the office of
the State Registrar.
"6. If the registrant or his representative does not examine said findings on the
date fixed, or does not dispute or contest them in a court proceeding within 30 days
thereafter, the State Registrar shall correct said certificate in accordance with said evi-
dence, and Board regulations, and issue a copy (or copies) of the certificate.
"7. If said certificate qualifies for clearance under Act 46 of 1970 the State Regis-
trar shall, with red ink and rubber stamp, place next to the registrant's name the inscrip-
tion, 'White', or 'Indian', as the case may be.
"8. If the parents of said registrant as shown on said certificate qualify for clear-
ance under Act 46 of 1970, each shall be indicated as above. If one of the two parents'
genealogy is unquestioned it shall be indicated, as filed, or as properly corrected.
"9. If either or both parents do not qualify for clearance under Act 46 of 1970,
in accordance with the evidence available, there shall be stamped in red ink on said
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The withholding of a birth certificate pending the determination of
one's racial status poses a direct injury to those individuals within the
class. Without a birth certificate an individual may be denied access to
many activities and institutions. For example, in Louisiana a birth
certificate is necessary to apply for a marriage license, 110 to register a
child in a public school system and to qualify for school athletics.' 1 '
Under federal law a birth certificate provides the necessary information
to apply for employment as a minor,1 2 to apply for a passport" 3 and to
obtain certain social security benefits."14 Persons whose birth certifi-
cates have been withheld may be denied enjoyment of these rights and
privileges, among others, for as long as it takes the registrar's office to
trace their genealogy. This deprivation stems solely from the fact that a
child who has been identified as white by the physician or midwife may
have a traceable amount of negro blood. This is also in spite of
Louisiana law which recognizes an individual's right to receive a birth
registration upon request." 5
Act 46 may be constitutional because it is merely definitional, but
that does not necessarily mean that the withholding process established
by regulation under the act is also constitutional. Persons whose ge-
nealogy has been called into question, the "border-line negroes," may be
deprived of those rights and benefits which are contingent upon posses-
sion of a birth certificate and thereby denied their constitutional rights to
due process and equal protection. 1 6
original certificate opposite the race of the parent or parents the words, 'In question.'
This may only be deleted by a judgment of court.
"10. If an applicant who is affected by Act 46 of 1970, or his representative,
makes application for a certified copy of a birth certificate or death certificate, he may,
at his option, receive a short form Birth Registration Card or Death Registration Card
which shall contain all pertinent facts contained on the original long form except the
names of parents and facts concerning them." La. Bd. of Health, REGs. OF JAN. 30,
1971. See State ex reL Plaia v. Louisiana Bd. of Health, 296 So. 2d 809, 811-12 n.1
(La. 1974).
110. IA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:241 (1965).
111. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 17:167 (1963). The statute states: "All children
...shall be required to present a copy of their official birth record to the school prin-
cipal. Only records from the local or state registrar of vital statistics will be accepted
for children born in Louisiana." Note also that the parish and city school boards may
require the submission of additional evidence as to age or race, where such is not con-
clusively established by the birth certificate.
112. 29 C.F.R. § 570.4(a)(1) (1975).
113. 22 C.F.R. § 51.43(a) (1975).
114. 20 C.F.R. § 404.703(b) (1975).
115. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:156 (1965); see IA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:158
(1965) (relating to the disclosure of records).
116. As stated by Justice Barham in his dissent in Plaia: 'The registrar has the
power to withhold or change the birth certificate of anyone having a traceable amount
of Negro blood. Citizens of other races do not have to endure this administrative pro-
cedure." 296 So. 2d at 812.
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Another harm, though not necessarily an actionable one, may
result when one visually white is classified negro under Act 46. Histori-
cally, in Louisiana it has been held to be slander, actionable per se, to
say of a white man that he is a negro or akin to a negro. In 1888 in
Spotorno v. Fourichon, the Supreme Court of Louisiana stated:
Under the social habits, customs, and prejudices prevailing in Lou-
isiana, it cannot be disputed that charging a white man with being
a negro is calculated to inflict injury and damage. We are con-
cemed with these social conditions simply as facts. They exist and,
for that reason, we deal with them. No one could make such a
charge, knowing it to be false, without understanding that its effect
would be injurious, and without intending to injure."-,
Although Spotorno has never been overruled, it is reasonable to assume
that a court in this decade would reach a different result. It is also
highly unlikely that an action for defamation could be based on state
issuance of a birth certificate. All -the same, the Spotorno precedent
stands as a testimonial to the inferior social status that impliedly attaches
to the designation "negro." Most likely, the plaintiffs in Thomas,
Messina and Plaia who challenged Act 46 did so not only because each
considered his or her birth certificate to be inaccurate but because each
viewed the designation "negro" as a "badge of slavery." 1 8
When the 1/32 test of Act 46 is compared with its predecessors, it
becomes eminently clear that such tests, harmless on their face, have
been used in a discriminatory manner. The former tests were used with
a measure of sensitivity to the difficulty of tracing a person's genealogy
back several generations. Although the former traceable amount test
seems harsh, the 1/32 test is even more irrational than those previously
adopted, as evidenced by the elimination of the 1/32 test from the early
anti-cohabitation statute."" Harms may result from the application of
Act 46, but they may not be of sufficient legal weight to overturn the
act. However, if a third set of statutes operates in conjunction with Act
46 and birth registrations, much more serious harm could result.
IV. A Case to Circumvent
Preferred Minority Programs
Intuitively, one knows that Act 46 harms persons who are visually
black as well as persons who are visually white. However, no actual
harm has been demonstrated, except for that caused by the lack of a
birth certificate and the inference of racial inferiority. Although a
parallel has been drawn between the injuries suffered under Act 46 and
117. 40 La. Ann. 423, 4 So. 71 (1888); see G. STEPHENSON, RACE DisTNCTIoNs
IN AMERICAN LAW 26-27 (1910).
118. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 555 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
119. See text accompanying notes 39-47 supra.
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the active discrimination which attached to the former standards, the
statutes which currently interact with Act 46 pose no active discrimina-
tion. However, what would the result be if Act 46 and the birth
registration statutes were used to circumvent various federal and state
programs designed to cure the effects of past discrimination? Act 46
would no longer be passive. The author posits three hypothetical
situations in which Act 46 could be used to avoid the legal mandates for
effectuation of racial equality.
Employment
Suppose an employer in State X was sued for racially discriminato-
ry employment practices under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.120 In order to settle the lawsuit the employer agrees, inter alia, to
implement an affirmative action program which includes a minority
hiring quota. The legislature of State X recently passed Act 46 of
1970. The racial composition of the state is heterogeneous, but public
officials use the statute to classify persons having "more than 1/32
negro blood" as negroes. The employer fills his minority quota with
"Act 46 negroes," persons visually white but designated negro on their
birth certificates, thereby retaining his all-white work force. Since no
definition of negro is set out in the Title VII guidelines, 121 the employer
contends that he has fully complied with the minority hiring policy.
120. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1971).
121. Employers may acquire racial information necessary for completing Form
EEO-1 either by visual surveys of the work force or from past employment records as
to the racial or ethnic identity of the employees, 29 C.F.R. § 1602.13 (1975). Employer
Information Report EEO-1 and Instructions, Standard Form 100, Appendix, No. 4
Race/Ethnic Identification, states: "The concept of race as used -by the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission does NOT denote clearcut scientific definitions of an-
thropological origins. For the purposes of this report, an employee may be included in
the group to which he or she appears to belong, identifies with, or is regarded in the
community as belonging. See 1 CCH EMPLOY. PRAC. 2173, at 1655-2 (1975) (em-
phasis added); accord Apprenticeship Information Report EEO-2-E and Instructions, In-
structions for Filing, No. 7 Minority Group Identification, 1 CCH EMPLOY. PRAC. f
2179, at 1679 (1974); State and Local Government Information Report EEO-4, Instruc-
tions for Filing, Appendix, No. 2 Race/Ethnic Identification, also stating that the
category "black" includes persons of African descent as well as those identified as
Jamacian, Trinidadian and West Indian, 1 CCH EMPLOY. PRAC. 1 2188, at 1691-6
(1974); Elementary-Secondary Staff Information Report EEO-5, Instructions, Appendix,
No. 3 Race/Ethnic Identification, also stating that "Black" includes all persons having
origins in any of the black racial groups, 1 CCII EMPLOY. PR c. 2189, at 1691-19
(1976); Higher Education Staff Information Report EEO-6, Instructions, Appendix, No.
7 Race/National Origin Identification, also stating that "Black" should include persons
of black African descent as well as those of the black race identified as Jamacian,
Trinidadian, and West Indian, 2 CCH EMPLOY. PRAc. 1 5235, at 3451 (1974).
The EEOC lists four methods that may be used by unions to obtain data on race,
color, national origin and sex. These are 1) use of existing records; 2) visual survey
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Education
Suppose State X has racially segregated schools. As in Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,122 a district court has im-
posed a racial balance requirement of 57 percent white to 29 percent
black on individual schools and has ordered busing to implement deseg-
regation. The legislature of State X has enacted Act 46 of 1970. Under
this statute the previously all-white schools within the region are now
significantly balanced due to the change in the racial designation of
many students who were formerly classified white.1 3  Eo instante, the
all-white schools achieve racial balance. The district court is stymied
when the counsel for the board of education submits statistics to show
that racial balance has been achieved without busing. The federal
attempt to achieve desegregation within the schools has been circum-
vented.
Voting
State X is subject to the Voting Rights Act of 1965,124 passed by
Congress to eliminate racial discrimination in voter registration. The
legislature of State X has passed Act 46 of 1970. The state registrar of
vital statics has determined that a substantial portion of the state's
visually white population should be reclassified negro to comply with the
racial classification set forth in Act 46. The attorney general of State X
goes to the director of the census and to the district court for the District
of Columbia and contends that now over fifty percent of the nonwhite
or "head count;" 3) tally from personal knowledge; and 4) self-identification. EEOC
states that if records are available, they should be used. Self-identification is not encour-
aged. See Instructions for Filing Local Union Report EEO-3 and Keeping of Records,
No. 14 Methods of Obtaining Information as to Race, Color, National Origin, and Sex,
1 CCH EMPLOY. PRAc. 2187, at 1689-2 (1973) (emphasis added); accord, Instructions
for. Filing Equal Employment Opportunity Appenticeship Information Report EEO-2
and Keeping of Records, No. 7 Minority Group Identification, 1 CCH EMPLOY. PRAC.
M 2176, at 1667 (1974).
122. 402 U.S. 1 (1971). See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974); Keyes v.
School Dist., 413 U.S. 189 (1973); United States v. Scotland Neck Bd. of Educ., 407
U.S. 484 (1972); Wright v. Emporia City Council, 407 U.S. 451 (1972).
123. Note the retroactivity problem which Act 46 presents to those birth certificates
issued prior to 1970. In response to letter of inquiry dated Sept. 26, 1975, counsel for
the Louisiana Board of Health stated: "No attempt is made to reclassify all of the cer-
tificates on file...." See CORRESPONDENCE, supra note 28. When the question was
posed as to how many persons would be affected if all whites having more than
1/32 negro blood were reclassified, counsel responded: "[W]e have no way of 'knowing
how many persons are affected." See CORRESPONDENCE, supra note 28.
124. Voting Rights Act of 1965-Extension, PuB. L. No. 94-73, 7 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS at 1458 (Aug. 25, 1975), 89 Stat. 400 (1975); see S. REP. No. 295,
94th CONG., 1st SnEs. (1975); see generally U.S. COMMISSION ON CvIL RIGm, THE
VOTING RIGHTs ACT: TEN YE&Rs ArrTE (Jan. 1975).
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population is registered since, by legislative decree, certain whites are
now "negro." The director of the census, using state statistics, must
come to the same conclusion because birth certificates are prima facie
evidence of race.' 25 The intended result of the Voting Rights Act has
been thwarted.
In the three hypotheticals posed, state law is relied upon to deter-
mine who is a negro. These hypotheticals suggest potential harm to
visual blacks who are denied the intended benefits of federal law regard-
ing employment, education and voting because visual whites classified
"negro" under Act 46 receive the benefits in their place. 12 6 Act 46,
formerly upheld as reasonable for purposes of classification on birth
certificates, now has an extra-jurisdictional effect. Was the intended
purpose of the federal legislation to alleviate discrimination against "Act
46 negroes"? Can a valid legislative purpose be served where the
program includes persons who by common understanding do not fall
within the class sought to be protected?
A state such as the hypothetical State X would contend that the
1.5/32 negro, though visually white, is nonetheless a full-blooded negro,
and therefore entitled to the protection of federal remedial legislation.
However, the foregoing analysis of the 1/32 test in Louisiana suggests
that there is no historical or factual basis for finding that persons with as
little as 1.5/32 negro blood have been the victims of racial discrimina-
tion.
Act 46 in these hypotheticals bears no rational relationship to the
governmental purpose sought to be accomplished. In fact, it would
defeat that purpose. Where the statute has proven to be vague, un-
workable and overtly and covertly discriminatory, it cannot stand. As
noted in Yick Wo v. Hopkins:
Though the law be fair on its face and impartial in appearance,
yet, if it is applied and administered by public authority with an
evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and
illegal discriminations between persons in similar circumstances,
material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the
prohibition of the Constitution.127
The Louisiana Supreme Court's decision in Plaia produces an
anomalous result. While the court upheld the constitutionality of Act
125. L.A. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:159 (1965).
126. In letter of inquiry dated Sept. 26, 1975, the author asked the board of health:
"Could employers use the "Negro" classification on the birth certificate to employ visu-
ally white persons in positions reserved for minorities under the government's affirmative
action program, thereby circumventing such government programs in education (busing)
employment (affirmative action), and voting (Voting Rights Act of 1965)?" Counsel
for the board responded: "The answer to this question is yes and I know of no impedi-
ment under the Civil Rights Act." See CommpoNDENcE, supra note 28.
127. 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886).
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46 it granted the plaintiff's request to have her birth certificate changed.
No decision yet has upheld the board of health's determination.
However, the fact that the 1/32 determination may be easily overruled
only serves to protect Act 46 from consideration on its merits.
V. Racial Designation: Where to Draw the Line
But where is the line to be drawn? All racial designations are not
necessarily arbitrary. Yet, to be valuable a scheme of racial classifica-
tion must meet all or most of the following conditions: 1) the criteria
must be objective, that is, the racial designation of a given individual
must be the same, or very nearly the same, when he or she is classified
by different observers; 2) the traits must be innate and inherited, that
is, they must not be influenced so much by the individual's surroundings
that his or her innate constitution is masked; 3) the traits must be
determined by one, or a small number of genes, for example, those
determinating visual characteristics.128  To establish a system of racial
designation, the author suggests four possible methods: 1) visual classi-
fication; 2) self-classification; 3) a limited percentage classification; and
4) a hybrid classification using a combination of the first and second
methods.
The first method suggested is visual classification according to
various physical features such as skin pigmentation. A person is classi-
fied according to the way others see him or her. The advantage of such
a classification is obvious-the determination is simple, efficient and
universal. Such a definition is also more anthropological and taxonomi-
cal because one is classified according to the characteristics of the norm.
One weakness in this approach is that some persons of mixed racial
background are not easily identifiable as being of one race or another.
Through visual identification some persons may classify the person as
white while others would classify him or her as black.
The second method suggested is that of self-designation: I am what
I perceive myself to be. Such a method would alleviate the problem of
visual gradations, mentioned above. Where society cannot classify
because visual traits are not determinative, the person classifies himself
or herself according to his or her own view. Logically, an individual
should be classified according to one's own view of racial ancestry.
This approach has two problems. First, there are no readily
defined parameters so it is not a universal approach to racial identifica-
tion. Another problem is that under self-designation one can choose a
designation which belies reality. A well-tanned individual could accept
all the social advantages of being white yet also rely on a self-designated
128. This is a variation of Boyd, Critique of Methods of Classifying Mankind, in
THis Is RACE (E. Count ed. 1950).
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minority status to accept the benefits granted to racial minorities. Should
such an individual be afforded the special protection extended by the
Fourteenth Amendment? In order for self-classification to be a viable
method of racial designation, it must rest on a reasonableness standard
which would defeat the "chameleon" effect. To protect universality as
well as reasonableness, the burden of proof of ancestry should remain on
the proponent of the classification.
The third method suggested is classification along ancestral lines to
a percentage, but within realistic limits. Classification to the 1/4
degree seems not impossible nor totally impractical since existing birth
records afford reasonable accuracy in tracing genealogy to one's grand-
parents. The author, however, rejects any such method because it relies
upon genealogical heritage rather than observable characteristics to
make the determination of race, and because it necessarily implies that
the race of one ancestor is more important than the race of the other
five. Furthermore, this note has shown the inconsistencies and inaccu-
racies which do exist in birth records even of one's grandparents.
Similarly, such a method would make the records of the grandparents'
race almost conclusive as to recognized racial status. A percentage
system, therefore, does not appear to be the best possible alternative.
The most appealing method of classification is a hybrid comprised
of the first and second alternatives. One is classified according to his or
her visual characteristics at birth, establishing a rebuttable presumption
as to race. One could rebut this presumption by showing that the birth
certificate is incorrect according to self-classification. The burden of
proof required would be that of reasonableness.
The year is 1976. A child is born visually white. The registrar of
vital statistics for the state board of health classifies the baby as white
based solely on appearance. When the child grows up, he has less-than-
dark skin and could easily be considered caucasian. However, the child
develops viewing himself as black since his grandparent was black. Then
the child seeks to have his racial status changed to conform to his self-
perceived racial identity. He shows that this is reasonable in light of his
racial ancestry. There is no need to classify to any specific percentage
or to any mathematical certainty. The district court or the administra-
tive agency makes the determination whether or not such a racial
designation is reasonable.
Conclusion
An obscure Louisiana statute that classifies according to a minute
percentage of negro blood has been held constitutional by the highest
court of that state. The act not only creates serious problems of
implementation but also suggests potential harms to visual whites and
blacks, causing one to reflect on the nature of racial classification. If
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racial classification is to be made, it must conform to its intended
purpose. Act 46 of 1970 has too many inherent weaknesses to meet all
intended purposes. Whatever the method of classification to be adopt-
ed, a standard of reasonableness must be applied. In this context the
reasonableness standard demands that the interests of society be satisfied
without harming the interests of the individual. The interests of society
as a whole are not served when a state lends its prestige to the enactment
of a statute having invidious overtones.
